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THE DEMAND FOR TAX RETURN PREPARATION

SERVICES
Jeffrey A. Dubin, Michael J. Graetz, Michael A. Udell, and Louis L. Wilde*
Abstract-We analyze taxpayer choices of return preparation
services. We distinguish between two types of nonpaid preparers, six types of paid third parties, and self-preparation. Among

other things, we find significant differences in the factors
which explain the demand for paid third parties who are and
are not able to represent clients before the IRS. Among these
factors are increases in IRS audit rates and the frequency of
IRS penalties.

in tax compliance. Scotchmer (1989), emphasizing
the informational aspects of third party ass'istance, suggests that if risk neutral taxpayers are
not sure of their true taxable income, they will
tend to overreport their tax- liability because the
cost of underreporting exceeds the cost of overre-

porting due to IRS penalties. In her models,
I. Introduction

taxpayers hire the services of informed third par-

r IHE IRS has estimated that 44.2% of the

thereby lower the amount of reported tax liabil-

ties who reduce or eliminate uncertainty, and
individual returns filed in 1979 were self-pre-

ity.

pared, and that these returns accounted for 22.8%

Reinganum and Wilde (1991) analyze a game

of detected noncompliance. Returns prepared

theoretic model of taxpayer, tax practitioner, and

with third party assistance accounted for 55.8%

IRS behavior that focuses on the service aspects

of filings and 77.2% of the detected noncompli-

of third party assistance. They characterize four

ance. Among returns prepared with third party

types of equilibria, depending on whether taxpayers prefer'to use tax practitioners and whether

assistance, however, only 16.7% used what we
call here a "tax practitioner" (public accountant

the IRS prefers them to use tax practitioners.

or attorney) yet these returns accounted for 42.7%

When tax practitioner penalties for noncompliance are sufficiently low and the efficiency gains
from using practitioners are sufficiently high, the

of underreported tax, 28.5% used other paid preparers accounting for 30.8% of underreported
tax, and the remaining 10.6% used nonpaid assistance accounting for 3.7% of underreported tax.1
A detailed breakdown of the distribution of
preparation modes for 1979 and the associated
proportions of tax noncompliance are reported in
table 1.
Economic theory has only recently focused on
the demand for third party assistance and its role
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IRS prefers taxpayers to prepare' their own returns, but taxpayers prefer to use a tax practi-

tioner. In this case, the use of a tax practitioner is
associated with lower compliance and higher audit rates.

Finally, Mazur and Nagin (1987), emphasizing
the strategic aspects of third party assistance,
observe that many paid preparers are "not just
passive scribes whose function is limited to relieving their clients of the mechanical requirements

of return preparation. To varying degrees they
provide information on legal requirements and
the penalties for their breach, develop strategies
for reducing tax liability, provide counsel on the
risks of executing such strategies and inform
clients of topical enforcement priorities."

for research support (Grant No. SES-870443) as do Professors
Dubin and Wilde (Grant-No. SES-8701027). Professor Graetz
is currently serving as Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy)
Most empirical analyses of the demand for
of the Treasury. This article was written before Professor
third party assistance have estimated the effects
Graetz assumed that office and does not necessarily reflect
the views of the Treasury Department. We acknowledge the
of types of income, other return characteristics,
very helpful comments of an anonymous referee.

CPAs and attorneys are automatically able to represent
clients before the IRS. Other paid preparers may provide
these services only after passing a written exam sponsored by
the IRS, and fulfilling certain continuing education requirements. Because most public accountants meet these requirements, we include them in the tax practitioner category.

Copyright

and various socio-economic factors on the choice
between self-preparation and all forms of third
party assistance. Using a variety of data sources
including surveys (Slemrod and Sorum, 1984;

Collins, Milliron and Toy, 1988; Hite, 1987),

?1992
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76 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
- TABLE 1.-NUMBER OF RETURNS, FREQUENCY, AND PROPORTION OF

NONCOMPLIANCE BY PREPARATION MODE FOR 1979a
Total Returns Filed

Proportion of

Mode of Preparation Number Frequency Noncompliance
Self
Non-Paid
IRS

39959000

assistedb

0.442

1265686

0.228

0.014

0.004

Other Non-Paidc 8317320 0.092 0.033
Paid Preparers
National Tax Service 8588600 0.095 0.054
Local Tax Service 10488000 0.116 0.132
Other Paid 6690000 -0.074 0.122
Practitioners

Public Accountant d 5605200 0.062 0.102
CPA! 6057200 0.067 0.258
Attorney and CPA 3435450 0.038 0.067
Total 90406000 1.000 1.000
a

b

Source:
The

IRS

Special

Academic

Assistance

Research

category

0.004.

The other nonpaid category usually consists of a family member who helps prepare the return. We have
combined in this category all VITA prepared returns. VITA is an acronym for Volunteer Income Tax Assistance,
which consists of unpaid volunteers who prepare returns after receiving limited instruction, typically from the IRS.

d Public Accountants are licensed at the state level with requirements varying by state. Only four states, North
Carolina, Virginia, Kansas, and Wyoming do not regulate Public Accountants. National Tax Services, which in
1979 consisted entirely of H & R Block and Beneficial Financial' Services Co., and Local Tax Services often provide
their own training, but do not require employees to be Public Accountants.

eCPA'is an abbreviation for Certified Public Accountant.

TCMP data (Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde, 1989;
Erard, 1990), and the IRS Master File (Long andCaudill, 1987) researchers have found that the
demand for third party assistance increases with
amounts of total or complex income, age, return
complexity, tax rates, the number of dependents,
and self-employment, and decreases with the level

The paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents an econometric specification of the de-mand for tax preparation services. Section III
describes the data we use and models we estimate. Section IV presents our results and conclusions.

II. A Model of Paid Preparer Selection

of education.

A complete characterization of the impact of
third parties on tax compliance would include
analyses of taxpayer choices of the kind of third
party assistance, the effect of third parties on tax
compliance, and the IRS posture towards returns

completed by third parties. We begin this expanded characterization by analyzing taxpayers'
choices among 12 modes of third party assistance,
using nested logit techniques applied to aggregate
data from the Special Academic Research File of
the 1979 Individual Return Taxpayer Compliance
Measurement Program (TCMP). Although the
best data on third party assistance released to
date by the IRS, this data file limits the analysis
to 696 aggregated observations from 12 IRS audit
classes and 58 IRS districts.2

We group types of return preparers according
to natural patterns of substitutability. One group
consists of CPAs, attorneys, and public accountants, which we label "practitioners," most of
whom are licensed to represent taxpayers before
the IRS. The second group consists of national
tax services, local tax services, and -other paid
preparers who generally are not able to represent
their clients before the IRS. The third group
consists of third party assistors who are free of
charge. A final group consists of self-preparers.
We account for this pattern of substitutability in
our estimation by using a two-stage nested multinomial logit model.3
First we estimate taxpayer choices among the
four broad categories: practitioners, paid prepar-

2 For precise definitions of IRS audits classes as well as For a detailed discussion of the nested logit model see
recent estimates of overall noncompliance see IRS (1990).

McFadden (1978).
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0.011; IRS Prepared, with a population frequency of 0.001; and IRS Reviewed, with a population frequency of
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ers, nonpaid preparers, and self-preparation.

Then we estimate taxpayers' choices between the
modes of assistance within each category.4 Let
i = 1,..., I index the preparation category, and

let j = 1,2,..., Ji index the specific assistance

Estimation of equations (4) and (5) requires estimates of the choice probabilities for which we use
the observed selection frequencies and measures
of X and Y for which we use group weighted
averages. Denote the probability that an individ-

modes within category i. We assume that the

ual in the kth IRS district chooses alternative ij
as pik. Let the number of cases in the kth IRS
ij, Pi, can be written as the product of the condidistrict be Nk and denote the frequency of occurtional probability Pjli and marginal probability
Pi of alternative ij in district k as F,j. Suprences

probability that an individual chooses alternative

with each probability in the multinomial logit

pressing the superscript k we can write

form

log
I ] I = 1j3LX + Aiii, (6)
Ft11

pili = E?Z 1e0lix (1

and

e aY+ OiIi

P

i

aYiii

(2)

Here X and Y are vectors of observed attributes
which vary by audit class and IRS district and Il
is the expected maximum utility (or inclusive
value) a taxpayer derives from alternatives in the
ith category with

with

,ili = logL - log L
and

Ji

Ii=

log -F] = a'Y + Oi(Ii - I) + ,i (7)

logE

efliX.

(3)

j=1

= log[j -log[].

The unknown parameters in this model are Bjli,
calculations show that
ai, and Oi with the latter being a measure Straightforward
of the
dissimilarity of alternatives in the ith category.5
E(Ajli)= 0
Since our data are aggregated to the IRS dis-

trict level, we estimate Pjii and Pi using an aggregate form of the nested logit model.6 Specifically,
we form the log odds for equations (1) and (2) as

log[ j' ] = VL X v j 1, (4)

1

1

1

V(Ajli) = N p + p | for j 1, (8)
1

cov(Aj1i' i ZL=i) NP for j + 1, (9)
and that

and

E(Ai) = 0,

P^[i1 =>^t +nt _ra-I, v fi * 1.

V j+ )for] j+1, (10)

4Alternative patterns of substitutability are considered by
Udell (1991).

1

cov(Q1,uj,1) = NP for 1. (11)

5McFadden (1978) proves that if 6' lies in the closed inter-

val [0,1] the resultant nested logit is consistent with random
Since

utility maximization.

6 The estimation of nested logit models has to date relied
exclusively on individual level data. We extend the nested
logit method for use with aggregate data following Berkson
(1944) and Theil (1969). Implicit in this development is the
assumption of homogeneity of individuals within the aggregation classes. For a discussion of the robustness properties of
logit techniques when applied to aggregate data, see also
Allenby and Rossi (1991).

Pij varies with the alternative and N varies
with the size of each audit class and IRS district,
equations (8) and (10) present a classic form of
7Our data set has an average of 70 individuals per cell.

Monte Carlo evidence reported in Domencich and McFadden

(1975) shows that when cell sizes are large (over 30 observations) the Berkson-Theil estimator of equations (6) and (7)
has very small sample bias (see table 5.1, p. 113).
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78 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
heteroscedasticity. Furthermore, a nonzero covariance is also present (equations (9) and (11))
since the log odds equations (6) and (7) use
common comparison groups. Minimum chi-square
estimation of the nested logit model corrects simultaneously for this covariance structure.
III. Model Specification

The TCMP program involves line-by-line audits of approximately 50,000 randomly chosen
individual tax returns. Our data file aggregates
the results of the 1979 TCMP audits by IRS
district and audit class. Six audit classes comprise
returns where income was not derived principally
from farm or sole-proprietorship activities, three
others where income was derived principally from
sole-proprietorships, and a final three where income was derived principally from farm activities.
For every line for each audit class in each of the
districts, taxpayers' reported amounts are
recorded as well as the adjusted amounts recom-

mended by the TCMP audit. For the 1979 TCMP,
additional information was recorded on the 12
return preparation modes used by taxpayers. To

of third party assistance or self-preparation is a
function of the IRS audit rate (AUDIT), the
frequency of penalties (PENALTY), the percentage of the adult population with a high school
education (EDUCATE), the percentage of the

adult population over 65 years old (AGE65),
state, local,- and real-estate tax deductions
(TAXDED), other deductions (OTHDED), the

number of exemptions (EXEMPT), the sum of
wage, interest, and dividend income (SIMPLE),
the sum of schedule C gross receipts and partnership income (BUSINESS), other income
(OTHINC), and the number of forms included

with the taxpayer's return (FORMS).
Although we make no attempt to test one
against another, our predictions regarding the
effects of the explanatory variables on the demand for third party assistance are based on the
service, information, and strategic motives. We
next summarize our general expectations regarding the effects of the explanatory variables on the
demand for third party assistance with occasional
reference to specific motives.

Since neither nonpaid nor paid preparers generally can represent clients before the IRS, inavoid districts with too few observations, we comcreases in the IRS enforcement activity variables
bine all attorneys into a single category and asRATE or PENALTY should increase the demand
sign the following mnemonics to the resulting
for practitioners.8 Because more educated taxpractitioner alternatives:
payers are better able to prepare their own rePA = Public Accountant
turns, represent themselves before the, IRS, deAIT = Attorney, or Attorney and CPA

CPA = Certified Public Accountant.
The three paid-preparer alternatives are
LTS = Local Tax Service

OPP = Other Paid Preparer
NTS = National Tax Service.

Finally, we combine several nonpaid assistance
alternatives and assign the following mnemonics:
IRS = IRS prepared, IRS reviewed,
or IRS assisted

ONP = Volunteer Income Tax Assistance,
or Other Nonpaid Preparers
SELF = Self-prepared.

termine their own- true tax liability, and engage in
appropriately strategic behavior, increases in
EDUCATE should reduce the demand for all

modes of third party assistance and increase self-.
preparation. An increase in AGE65 may possibly
increase the demand for preparers and practitioners based on the service and information motives.9

Our tax return variables reflect the TCMP. adjusted levels for three basic components of the
tax calculation: income, deductions, and exemp-

tions.'0 We use three measures of income; the
sum of wages, interest, and dividends, the sum of
schedule C gross receipts and partnership in-

As discussed in the Introduction, three basic
motives for taxpayers to use third-party assistance8 The audit rate is based on audits accomplished data pro-

have been identified; information (Scotchmer);

service (Reinganum and Wilde); and strategic
(Mazur and Nagin). Our choice of explanatory
variables parallels these motives. In particular, we
assume that the probability of choosing any mode

vided by the Examination Division of the IRS. The frequency
of penalties is obtained directly from the aggregated TCMP
data file.

9 The percentage of the adult population with a high school
education and the percentage of the adult population over
age 65 are from the Statistical Abstract of the United States
for the year 1979.
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FIGURE 1.-CHOICE OF TAX RETURN PREPARATION SERVICES
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come, and all other income. Increases in

larger families have greater demand for tax ser-

SIMPLE should decrease the demand for third

vices, an increase in EXEMPT should increase

party assistance and increase self-preparation,

the demand for both preparers and practi-

since for taxpayers with predominately wage, in-

tioners." Finally, the number of forms is

terest, or dividend income, there is less need for

straightforward measure of return complexity and
service or information, less opportunity for strateas such increases in FORMS should increase the
gic behavior and little likelihood of IRS enforcedemand for both preparers and practitioners.
ment attention. Increases in BUSINESS should

increase the demand for practitioners since owners of small businesses do face substantial IRS
enforcement attention, considerable complexity,
and may as a normal business practice require
the services of attorneys or highly qualified accountants. We have no a priori expectations with
respect to the effect of increases in OTHINC on

the demand for third party assistance and selfpreparation, but include it in our specification in
order to account for all income.

We divide deductions into state, local, and real
estate taxes and other deductions. Since taxpay-

ers who pay state and local taxes may be subject
to state enforcement attention as well as IRS
enforcement attention, increases in TAXDED

IV. Results and Conclusions

The choice of third party assistance is estimated in two stages, as discussed in section II
and illustrated in figure 1. Table 2 presents the
elasticities of the unconditional choice probabili-

ties Pij with respect to the underlying explanatory variables.13
Our results generally are consistent with our
expectations. Increases in the IRS audit rate or
frequency of penalties increase significantly the
demand for practitioners. For the audit rate this

effect is limited to CPAs, but for the frequency of
penalties the effect applies to all three types of
practitioners. For the audit rate, this increase

may increase the demand for practitioners.1"
Uncomes
at the expense of national tax services

like state, local, and real estate taxes which are

not likely to be contested, other deductions often
are contested. This suggests that increases in
OTHDED should also increase the demand for

practitioners. By our definition, EXEMPT primarily measures family size. To the extent that

while for the frequency of penalties it comes
largely at the expense of self-preparation.

12 We subtract exemptions for over 65 years of age and
blindness from total exemptions. The remainder is a measure
of the number of persons supported by the taxpayer.

13 These elasticities are based on sequential estimation of

the nested logit model, which includes the estimation of the
dissimilarity parameters as discussed in section II. These
parameters are 0.28, 0.85, and 1.4 for nonpaid preparers, paid
1 The TCMP provides not only what the tax return repreparers, and practitioners, respectively. The last of these is
ported amounts were, but what the IRS believed the true
not significantly different from 1. The calculation of the elasamount to be. We use the corrected amounts of deductions
ticities is complicated by the fact that each explanatory variand exemptions as meaningful measures of the true amounts
able has a distinct affect on all alternatives at each level of the
of these items.
nested logit tree. The mean values of all variables and a
11 See Dubin, Graetz, and Wilde (1989) for a discussion of discussion of their units is available on request. Further
the relationship between state and federal enforcement activdetails concerning the data base, the estimation method and
ity.
calculation of the elasticities are available in Udell (1991).
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80 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
TABLE 2.-RESPONSE ELASTICITIES OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES BY MODE OF PREPARATION
Nonpaid Preparers Paid Preparers

Mode

IRS

ONP

LTS

OP

NTS

CONSTANT 0.695 4.625 -1.742 -0.762 -1.640

(0.845) (8.468) (- 2.290) (- 0.967) (- 2.098)
RATE

-0.573

0.266

0.254

-0.214

-0.787

(- 1.899) (1.331) (0.724) (- 0.600) (- 2.209)
PENALTY

-0.187

0.040

-0.005

0.136

0.054

(-0.836) (0.333) (-0.100) (1.875) (0.769)
EDUCATE -0.840 -3.119 0.484 -0.051 1.123

(-1.439) (-8.611) (1.192) (-0.118) (2.631)
AGE65

0.081

-0.542

-0.205

-0.584

-0.267

(0.293) (- 3.098) (- 1.545) (- 3.442) (- 1.757)
TAXDED

0.108

0.039

-0.175

0.073

-0.196

(0.560) (0.400) (- 2.707) (1.061) (- 2.707)
OTHDED -0.355 -0.007 0.206 -0.169 -0.065
(-'1.575) (-0.062) (2.758) (-2.038) (-0.791)
EXEMPT

-0.968

-1.587

1.087

1.240

1.345

(- 2.257) ( 6.650) (6.308) (6.382) (6.925)
SIMPLE -0.108 -0.362 -0.240 -0.317 -0.280

(-0.552) (-3.155) ((-3.964) (-4..352) (-3.919)

BUSINESS -0.077 -0.249 0.012 0.016 0.027

(- 0.220) (- 0.721) (0.257) (0.332) (0.518)
OTHINC 0.069 -0.108 -0.056 -0.053 0.003

(0.343) (-0.658) (-1.008) (-0.882) (0.054)
FORMS

-0.048

0.301

0.481

0.237

0.083

(- 0.075) (0.904) (2.609) (1.152) (0.399)
Practitioners Self-prepared

Mode

PA

ATT'

CPA

Self

CONSTANT -3.810 -5.583 -3.863 1.751
(- 4.830) (- 6.745) (- 5.015) (4.730)
RATE

0.228

0.160

0.443

-0.015

(1.176) (0.788) (2.326) (- 0.111)
PENALTY

0.363 0.244 0.490 -0.182
(5.535) (2.992) (8.065) (- 5.869)
EDUCATE -0.163 0.647 -0.391 0.274

(-0.460) (1.586) (- 1.182) (1.659)
AGE65

0.722

0.887

0.331

0.081

(4.301) (4.410) (2.142) (1.416)
TAXDED

0.180

0.195

0.137

-0.005

(4.883) (5.124) (4.098) (- 0.209)
OTHDED

-0.34

0.198

0.390

-0.068

(- 0.483) (2.679) (5.847) (- 2.471)
EXEMPT

1.445

1.249

1.006

-0.937

(7.583) (5.654) (5.663) (- 12.680)
SIMPLE

-0.267

-0.371

-0.179

0.345

(- 4.229) (- 5.366) (- 3.146) (12.397)
BUSINESS

0.085

0.068

0.104

-0.001

(1.861) (1.395) (2.319) (-0.003)
OTHINC

-0.029

-0.021

-0.023

0.049

(-0.588) (-0.378) (-0.497) (1.303)
FORMS

0.611

1.342

1.098

-0.624

(3.952) (7.944) (7.574) (- 6.526)
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses.
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As predicted, an increase in the percentage of

have obtained new results regarding the effect of

the adult population with a high school education

audit rates and the frequency of penalties on the

increases self-preparation. However, it does not

demand for third party assistance. These results

decrease the demand for all forms of third party

will be particularly important when we turn to the

assistance. In particular, other nonpaid preparer

effects of third party assistance on noncompli-

shows a statistically significant fall in demand,

ance. Nevertheless some of our results must be

and the demand for national tax services actually

viewed as preliminary. In particular, while our

shows a significant increase. An increase in the

results with respect to the percentage of the adult

percentage of the adult population over age 65

population over 65 and the number of exemp-

increases the demand for practitioners and de-

tions conform to our expectations, better data

creases the demand for paid preparers.

and further investigations are needed fully to

Some of our strongest results are obtained with

understand the relationship between' these vari-

respect to tax return variables. Increases in wages,

ables and the demand for third party assistance.

interest, and dividends significantly decrease the

Even at this early stage, we can, however, spec-

demand for all forms of third party assistance

ulate on the change in noncompliance induced by

except IRS assistance, and very significantly in-

a shift in return preparation. For example, con-

crease self-preparation. Increases in schedule C

sider a change in information reporting which has

gross receipts and partnership income, as ex-

the effect of increasing the amount of simple

pected, increase the demand for practitioners and

income relative to other forms of income. In this

have no significant effect on any other particular
mode of preparation including self-preparation.

case, we would predict an increase in self-pre-

Finally, an increase in other income, perhaps

tributable to self-prepared returns does not

surprisingly, has no statistically significant effect

change, then a net reduction in noncompliance
would result. However, since the choice of a type

on any form of third party assistance or self-preparations.

With respect to deductions, an increase in state,
local, or real estate taxes significantly increases

the demand for practitioners. However, it actually decreases the demand for local and national

paration. If the level of noncompliance at-

of tax return preparation may itself be conditioned on the level of tax evasion, consistent
determination of the levels of noncompliance attributable to specific preparer types must take
account of 'the potential for self-selection bias.

tax services, an effect which' we did not expect.
Among all the explanatory variables, the number
of exemptions has the strongest effects; increases
in it significantly decrease self-preparation and
increase the demand for all forms of paid third
party assistance. It also significantly decreases the
demand for nonpaid preparers. Finally, the number of forms also has a pattern of effects consistent with our expectations; increases in the
number of forms increase the demand for practitioners, decrease self-preparation, and have little
effect on the demand for other modes of third
party assistance.

These results' generally confirm the results ob-

tained by other investigators. However, in many
cases we find significant differences between the'
effect of explanatory variables on paid-preparers
as compared to practitioners. In particular, many
of the results obtained in previous studies which
differentiate only between self-preparation and
all forms of third party assistance seem to be
driven by the demand for practitioners. We also
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